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John Barclay’s Paul and the Gift is one of the most important theological books in recent 
years. In addition to being a professional and original study in exegetics, this monumental 
work can also be read as an intellectual history of the view of grace as gift in Christianity. 
The reader obtains, as superadded gifts, introductory courses in social anthropology and 




     The first part of the book, “The Multiple Meanings of Gift and Grace” offers 200 pages 
before the author is ready to proceed into biblical exegetics. Barclay discusses the different 
perfections of grace and the gift in the Greco-Roman world and later Western culture 
extensively. He considers that the modern idea of “pure gift” is influenced by the 
Reformation and connected with Martin Luther’s theology. This view is very close to Berndt 
Hamm’s recent claims in Luther research. While Barclay does not quote Hamm, his 
knowledge of Reformation research is otherwise impressive.  
     The first part is very erudite in its interdisciplinary observations. Barclay is well informed 
of older and more recent sociological, anthropological, and philosophical studies. The most 
impressive discussion, however, concerns his own main innovation to the theological nature 
of grace or gift. With the help of the (surprisingly old) rhetorical maxims of Kenneth Burke, 
Barclay argues that one can reach definitional clarity through “perfecting” a concept, that is, 
through drawing it out to its endpoint or extreme. Barclay’s own big innovative argument 
claims that, since gift-giving is a multifaceted phenomenon, the concepts of grace and gift 
can be perfected in multiple ways. (pp. 67-69).  
    Barclay drafts six different perfections of donative grace, that is, superabundance, 
singularity, priority, incongruity, efficacy and non-circularity. While each of them expresses 
a “pure” gift in its own specific manner, the six perfections are nevertheless conceptually 
distinct from one another. For instance, grace can be singular without having priority or 
efficacy. Grace can be superabundant without being incongruous or non-circular. Barclay 
wants to say to the philosophers that their quest after the “pure gift” needs to pay attention to 
the different perfections. More importantly, the six perfections serve for him as an exegetical 
tool which allows him to explain why and how some earlier Pauline scholarship on grace has 
gone wrong. 
     The second, third and fourth part of the volume present an extensive historical argument. 
The second part is devoted to “Divine Gift in Second Temple Judaism”, the third part focuses 
on Galatians and the fourth part on Romans. Barclay shows in great detail how Paul’s 
theology of grace and gift is best understood in terms of the incongruity of grace. While other 
perfections are also important, he claims that the incongruous grace unites the central themes 
of Pauline thinking (pp. 463, 561). Earlier scholarship has often confused this perfection with 




     Through his exegetical discussion, Barclay consistently assumes that charis can often be 
translated in terms of gift. In the last section of the book he offers an appendix “The Lexicon 
of Gift: Greek, Hebrew, Latin, and English”. Here he pays some attention to the Greek verb 
didomi and nouns like dosis and dorema. His analysis of biblical writings is nevertheless 
strictly focused on charis. This procedure is on the one hand necessary, since the meaning of 
charis can be debated and one needs extensive grounds to claim that this word means “the 
gift” so strongly that even anthropological comparisons are necessary to understand biblical 
grace.  
    On the other hand, the title “Paul and the Gift” evokes the expectation that the verb didomi 
and its compounds would be discussed at some length. Already the older exegetical 
scholarship (e.g. Wiard Popkes, Christus traditus, 1962) has shown how rich theological 
meanings are build around the basic terminology of giving and the gift in earliest 
Christianity. While the discussion on charis is extremely important by its own right, the 
horizon of donative terms in the New Testament is much broader. To be sure, Barclay offers 
a broader spectrum of terminologies in his concrete exegesis, considering a huge range of 
different vocabularies regarding divine giving and human reception.  
     Generally speaking, I am very happy that contemporary biblical scholars take 
philosophical and conceptual matters seriously and allow comparisons with historical 
(Cicero, Seneca) and contemporary (Alain Badiou, Derrida) thinkers. I am particularly glad 
that Barclay employs Luther’s theology and offers a reading which is close to many new 
publications in Luther studies (Hamm, Bo Holm and myself). In the new Luther-Handbuch 
(3rd ed., 2017, p. 42) Volker Leppin says that “the most important theological debate of 
current Luther scholarship concerns the nature of the gift”.  
     Not only Barclay’s analysis of Paul but also his views on Augustine, Luther and Calvin 
contribute to this debate and deserve to be read by all Reformation scholars. I believe that 
Barclay is right in identifying the modern desire to define the so-called “pure gift”. This 
concept emerges in the Reformation and finds different expressions in current philosophy and 
theology. I agree with Barclay that there is no one pure gift but several different versions or 




     A truly important study invites the reader to make critical responses. As a systematic 
theologian I have two criticisms to present. My first criticism concerns the basic 
methodological view that a concept is best clarified when drawn to its extreme endpoint. Let 
me label this view as “Platonic”, meaning that in knowing a concept we proceed from 
shadows to the ideal world where we finally meet the concept in its extreme clarity and 
perfection. The contemporary French debate on pure gift (Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion etc.) is 
Platonic in this sense. When Barclay proceeds from the textual shadows to the ideal 
perfection of the concept, he finds a plurality of perfections. After careful exegetical scrutiny, 
he claims that perfect “incongruity” is the most fitting Pauline idea of grace as gift. 
      Let me propose another methodology, namely, an “Aristotelian” one. In this method, the 
core meaning of the concept is something like a mean. The opposite extremes are important 
to know, but the truth and the virtue of the matter discussed are found between the extremes. 
Given this, a gift should, on the one hand, avoid commercial features. It cannot look like a 
bribe or a payment and it cannot be conditioned by strict expectations of return. On the other 




automaton which constructs and produces the reactions of its lethargic recipient. The true 
concept of the gift avoids both extremes. 
     The modern construction of unilateral pure gift (p. 63) exemplifies the Platonic method. 
The classical discussion of Seneca in De beneficiis as well as the modern anthropological 
studies proceed from an asymmetric reciprocity between givers and recipients, manifesting a 
more Aristotelian approach. Barclay holds that Paul’s view of incongruous grace does not 
rule out circularity because the gift carries expectations of obedience (p. 569). Barclay’s own 
methodology thus deals with the perfection of incongruity through moderating some other 
perfections of the gift. In this manner, his Platonic search is balanced with an Aristotelian 
attention of different perfections. 
      With the help of the Aristotelian conception we can also understand the world of gift-
giving so that not the extreme perfections but the ordinary and everyday practices of gift 
exchange express the paradigmatic gift. This is the trend in studies like Zemon Davis, The 
Gift in Sixteenth-Century France (2000), Henaff, The Price of Truth (2002/2010) and 
Godbout, The World of the Gift (1992/1999). Many biblical stories of giving and receiving 
can be explained in such Aristotelian manner. A rich youngster needs to sell all his property, 
a poor widow gives one or two small coins, a ruler is given his due. None of these acts 
intends to be “pure” in the sense of an extreme, but they all express a mean which does not 
exhaust the resources of the giver. After these acts, the rich youngster still has more 
capabilities than the poor widow. While their acts of giving are all proper in their own 
context, they are not pure gifts in any modern sense of the term. It may nevertheless be 
adequate to call them perfections in some manner. 
     But what about grace? Can we also read Paul in an Aristotelian fashion, arguing that 
charis can express a proper mean rather than a particular perfection? The best affirmative 
answer to this question would be a thorough exegetical argument. I cannot produce it here but 
offer a systematic argument which proceeds from Barclay’s view of Pauline grace as both 
incongruous and circular.  
      Seneca’s famous example (De beneficiis 2, 17) illustrates the incongruity between 
Antigonus and the cynic. When the cynic begs for a talent, Antigonus considers that this is 
more than a beggar can ask for. Then the cynic asks for a denarius. Antigonus replies that this 
is less than a king could becomingly give. Seneca goes on to remark that a continued 
circulation could solve the incongruity, as Antigonus could give a denarius, considering that 
every gift given out of kindness is proper. He could also remark that since cynics despise 
money they should not beg for it. Congruity can thus be found in spite of initial incongruity. 
      A theological analogy regarding incongruity and circularity would go as follows: God’s 
charis is completely incongruous with regard to sinful humanity. However, the story does not 
end here, as God expects some obedience and thus circularity. If divine charis were 
completely and irreversibly incongruous, no circularity could emerge. While circularity is 
conceptually different from incongruity, the real world can be so adjusted that they are both 
possible. An Aristotelian attempts to find a mean which would not violate the basic 
incongruity but nevertheless allows for some circularity. Therefore, what enables the 
encounter between the giver and the recipient is not a particular perfection but the moderation 
of several perfections. Obviously, this systematic argument would need to be accompanied 







       My second criticism concerns the very concept of incongruity. This concept is not 
univocal and can, because of historical reasons, contain a variety of different conceptions. 
When viewed purely abstractly, incongruity is a thin concept. Most things in the world do not 
fit well together with most other things. We live in a world of incongruities and it is rare to 
find congruous things, persons and groups. Incongruity is the norm; congruity is the 
exception. 
      To be sure, this is not what Protestant theology means with incongruous grace. For 
modern theologians, incongruity manifests an exception to the worldly rule. Thus, for 
Barclay, incongruity is connected with gift and grace. If we look at Thomas Aquinas and 
other Catholic scholastics, however, it is congruity which belongs to the realm of gift and 
friendship. Thomas holds that because of maximal inequality between God and humans no 
human can achieve any salvific merit based on worth (ex condigno). However, as God is 
generous, God can employ congruity which allows to see our worthless efforts in a positive 
manner (STh II/1 q114 a3r). 
    Given the gift-like economy of congruity, Thomas even considers that God can employ 
friendship so that people may help one another in the path of salvation. We cannot give each 
other any “worthy” merit in that respect, but we may remove obstacles and provide help to 
each other in the sense of congruity (STh II/1 q114 a6r). If you help me to know Christ, the 
merit is Christ’s, but because of divine congruity you also happen to be there, like a gift for 
me. In later Catholic theology, merits of congruity can be counted in favor of Christians, 
although their being congruous derives from God’s generosity, not the worth of humans. 
While justice demands an obligatory reward for merits based on worth, no such reward is 
required for merits of congruity. God grants the latter bonuses generously, without regard to 
the worth of the human agent. In addition to the strict economy of worth, God thus employs a 
gift economy based on congruity. 
      Due to complex late medieval developments, the Reformers condemn meritum de 
congruo as a variant of Pelagianism. Luther, Calvin and the Protestant orthodoxy argue that 
divine grace does not contain the idea of congruity. In other words, God does not consider 
any additional gift-like rewards related to congruous appearances. Given this, what do the 
Protestants mean when they speak of incongruous grace? The historical meaning remains 
restricted to this condemnation and does not yet define the vocabulary of incongruity. 
     A more elaborated option is to claim that there is a basic discrepancy and 
incommensurability between God’s grace and human standards. Modern Protestant theology 
has at least since Karl Barth adopted this claim. However, no clear alternative to Thomism 
emerges from it alone, as Aquinas himself postulates the maximal inequality between God 
and humans, denying salvific merits based on worth. Therefore, Thomas also adopts a basic 
theological incongruity in some sense. It can, however, be overcome through God’s 
congruous, gift-like generosity.  
     John Barclay’s own definition of incongruity proceeds very strongly from the concept of 
worth. The incongruity of a gift “does not take account of prior conditions of worth”. It is 
given “without regard to the worth of the recipient” (both p. 73). The recipients of 
incongruous grace are “wholly unqualified for divine beneficence”. Such event of grace 
brings “into question every pre-existent classification of worth” (pp. 566-567). The concept 
of worth is, however, here puzzling, since one is easily misled to think of meritum de 
condigno as the rejected opposite. 
     A Reformation scholar like myself is also puzzled by the fact that Barclay’s own 




meritum de congruo, namely, additional beneficence to unworthy recipients. Historically, the 
merit of congruity was received because of divine generosity. To speak of the gift 
manifesting an incongruity of grace is therefore somewhat challenging. 
       Barclay’s broader argument concerns the practices of gift-giving in the Greco-Roman 
world. He argues that the classical tradition of Seneca pays great attention to the worth of the 
recipients. For Barclay, the gift is congruous when it matches the worth of its recipients. The 
Pauline gift of grace is thus incongruous when compared to congruous Greco-Roman gifts. 
We have seen that the Thomist idea of God’s donative generosity manifests another variant of 
congruity. It is not clear, however, whether Barclay’s claim of incongruity rejects both the 
Greco-Roman and the Thomist variants of congruity. It looks that Barclay’s incongruity takes 
over some functions of Thomas’s congruity. 
      However, if one bypasses the Latin traditions, Barclay’s point is relatively easy to 
understand. He proceeds from the post-Barthian discrepancy between human and divine 
standards. I am ready to agree that Paul’s message of grace is something radically new when 
compared to human standards. It is the term “incongruity” and its historical underpinnings 
with which I have problems. I am aware that in the particular context of Pauline scholarship 
this term can illuminate the apostle’s alternatives to law and Jewish Christianity and that 
Barclay’s use of it aims to manifest an alternative to the “congruous” Greco-Roman gift 
practices. As my last point, I mention a problem related to this valuable historical aim. 
      Regarding the Greco-Roman views, Miriam Griffin argues in her Seneca on Society 
(2013, pp. 32-36) that Seneca’s advice for giving and receiving benefits does not assume an 
already existing conventional social structure (like friendship or patronage). Rather, the 
benefits constitute a new, voluntary relationship, often between partners of different status. If 
Griffin is right, then the Greco-Roman gift practice contains at least some seeds of 
incongruity. When Seneca’s benefits establish new ways of bridging and bonding, while 
maintaining inequality and distance, they express an incongruous relationship between the 
giver and the recipient. Seneca’s example of Antigonus and the cynic illustrates the 
constitutive power of the Greco-Roman benefit, moving between incongruity and congruity. 
     In sum, my second criticism says that it is not sufficient to define the crucial term 
“incongruity” merely as the opposite to human standards and worth. Given the great 
sophistication of different gift economies and the principles of congruity operative in them, 
Barclay’s concept remains underdetermined and open to misinterpretation. To rule out this 
problem, I would like to hear sharper distinctions between different kinds of gift economy. 
To say that the Pauline gift is incongruous because it “does not take account of prior 
conditions of worth” does not yet distinguish Pauline gift economy from other historical 
views of congruity and incongruity. 
